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WHO WILL PROTECT THE CONSUMERS OF
TRADEMARKED GOODS?
James B. Astrachan*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Federal and state law recognizes multiple forms of intellectual
property, including patents,1 copyrights,2 trademarks,3 and trade
secrets.4 Alleged violations of patents and copyrights are required by
statute to be litigated in the federal courts.5 Trademark rights can
arise under the Federal Lanham Act6 or state law.7 Trademark
infringement can be litigated in state or federal courts.8 Trade secrets
arising under state statutes are litigated in state courts unless diversity
jurisdiction exists and is pled.9
Infringement of intellectual property in the case of patents arises
when a patented invention is used, manufactured or imported into the
United States without authority of the patentee.10 Copyright
infringement results when any of the exclusive rights granted to a
copyright owner under 17 U.S.C. §106 are violated.11 Trademark
infringement results when a mark is used by a junior user in a manner
that causes a likelihood of confusion in the minds of consumers, and
*
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James B. Astrachan, J.D. University of Baltimore Law School (1974), LL.M.
Georgetown University Law Center (1978). Member, Astrachan Gunst Thomas,
P.C., Baltimore, MD, Adjunct Professor of Trademark Law University of Baltimore
Law School, Carey School of Law, University of Maryland. The author gratefully
acknowledges the capable assistance of Kaitlin D. Keating, University of Baltimore
J.D. and Colin D. McDaniels, University of Baltimore J.D. (2018, expected) for their
research skills and editing.
35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012).
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
Lanham Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012).
3 TERRENCE F. MACLAREN & MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS THROUGHOUT THE
WORLD § 40:1 (2016).
28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2012).
15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012).
3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
22:1.50 (4th ed. 2016).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (limiting state court jurisdiction over patent and copyright
cases, but not over trademarks).
MACLAREN & JAGER, supra note 4, § 40:41.
35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012).
17 U.S.C. § 501 (2012).
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potential consumers, with the senior user’s mark as to source,
connection, sponsorship, approval or affiliation.12
Remedies for infringement of intellectual property rights include
monetary damages to compensate the owner for its pecuniary loss
caused by the infringement, including recovery of lost profits.13 In
the case of patent infringement, an award of lost profits can take the
form of imposition of a reasonable royalty to compensate the patentee
for its loss.14 Copyright and trademark owners can be awarded actual
damages and the infringer’s profits, subject to a prohibition against
double recovery in the case of copyright.15 A trademark owner can
recover an infringer’s profits and its own damages.16 The statute
allows a court to award up to three times the actual damages and
profits earned.17 Monetary damages in the form of statutory damages
may also be available to copyright and trademark owners.18 An
award of monetary damages is intended to deprive a defendant of its
gains at the expense of the right’s owner.19
In addition to monetary awards, courts are authorized to enjoin
infringers of trademarks, copyrights, and patents from continuing
their infringing activities through injunctive relief.20 An injunction
can be issued before or after trial on the merits.21 A preliminary
injunction is relief sought before trial on the merits,22 and a
permanent injunction is relief sought following trial on the merits or
other dispositions, such as summary judgment.23 Injunctive relief is
not awarded lightly. The Supreme Court of the United States has
observed that “[a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
24:6 (4th ed. 2016).
See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (patents); 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2012) (copyright); 15
U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012) (recovery for violations of rights).
35 U.S.C. § 284.
17 U.S.C. § 504(b).
15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
Id.
17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) (2012).
Badger Meter, Inc. v. Grinnell Corp., 13 F.3d 1145, 1157 (7th Cir. 1994); Web
Printing Controls Co. v. Oxy-Dry Corp., 906 F.2d 1202, 1205 (7th Cir. 1990).
35 U.S.C. § 283 (2012) (patents); 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (2012) (trademarks); 17 U.S.C. §
502 (2012) (copyrights).
FED. R. CIV. P. 65.1.
Ansel v. Hicks, 846 F. Supp. 2d 493, 494 (W.D.N.C. 2012) (citing In re Microsoft
Corp. Antitrust Litig., 333 F.3d 517, 524–26 (4th Cir. 2003)).
See generally U.S. Polo Ass’n, Inc. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 800 F. Supp. 2d
515, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (stating permanent injunctions may be granted in
trademark and copyright infringement actions).
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never awarded as of right.”24 A permanent injunction is, likewise, a
“drastic and extraordinary remedy, which should not be granted as a
matter of course.”25
Often sought in a trademark infringement claim is preliminary
injunctive relief, issued prior to a trial on the merits, to prevent the
infringer from continuing its unlawful activities. To be entitled to
preliminary injunctive relief, the owner of the trademark who is
alleging infringement must establish at an early stage of litigation that
it is likely to succeed on the merits of its claim.26 In addition, the
movant is generally required to establish that it will suffer irreparable
harm.27 Irreparable harm is an injury that cannot be adequately
compensated by monetary payment.28 Damages to a business’s
intangible assets, such as reputation and goodwill, have also been
considered harm that is irreparable and from which injunctive relief
might follow.29 Irreparable harm might also occur where monetary
damages might otherwise compensate for the harm, but the defendant
is found by the court to be incapable of paying a monetary award
sufficient to make the plaintiff whole.30 The movant seeking
injunctive relief must further establish that the public interest will be
served by an injunction and that the balance of the hardships favors
its issuance.31
The grant of preliminary injunctive relief in a trademark
infringement matter may end the litigation. If the defendant can no
longer use the mark, pending trial, it may choose to adopt an
alternative mark and get on with its business. In preliminary stages
of infringement, there may not be profits to recover, and a junior user
ordered to cease use of an infringing mark may abandon its efforts
regarding the contested mark. Instead, a junior user may adopt a
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

31.

Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citing Munaf v. Geren,
553 U.S. 674, 690 (2008)).
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 165 (2010); see Weinberger v.
Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982).
Winter, 555 U.S. at 20.
Id.
Jayaraj v. Scappini, 66 F.3d 36, 39 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Jackson Dairy, Inc. v.
H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979)).
Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 824 F.2d 622, 625 (8th Cir. 1987).
Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 386 (7th Cir. 1984)
(explaining that monetary damages can be an insufficient remedy if: (1) the damage
award comes too late to save the plaintiff’s business; (2) the plaintiff cannot finance
the lawsuit; (3) the damages are unobtainable because the defendant is insolvent; or
(4) the nature of the plaintiff’s loss may make damages very difficult to calculate).
5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§§ 30:51–30:52 (4th ed. 2016).
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replacement mark, preferring to find a mark under which to sell
goods or services with which it can establish goodwill and source
identification without risk.
Injunctive relief may also be granted, in the form of a permanent
injunction, following trial, or grant of a motion for summary
judgment in favor of the movant, where the owner of the infringed
intellectual property rights has prevailed on the merits of its claim.32
All of the other factors listed above must also be established to obtain
permanent injunctive relief.33
The legislative history of the Lanham Act (the “Act”) is “long and
extensive.”34 Congressman Fritz Lanham, for whom the legislation is
named, in testimony offered to the United States House of
Representatives, averred that the purpose of his namesake bill was
“to protect legitimate business and the consumers of the country.”35
Both of these goals remain in place although the language contained
in the Act does not recognize the right of a consumer to bring an
action against a commercial party under the Act.36
This article explores whether the courts should consider trademark
infringement in a different light from patent and copyright
infringement, for purposes of determining whether a trademark
plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must establish irreparable harm, or
whether irreparable harm should be presumed when the trademark
owner seeking injunctive relief establishes it is likely to succeed, or
has succeeded at trial, on the merits of its claim that confusion is
likely to result if the defendant is allowed ongoing use of the
contested mark.37 Examining this question, this article explores the
differences in the nature of the rights protected by trademarks, as
distinguished from patents and copyrights.38 It also examines
whether courts should protect consumers who have no standing under
the Act in trademark disputes that exist between the users, or owners,
of two marks, but who are often injured, nevertheless, by the
resulting confusion, and whether it should consider the harm caused
to consumers by trademark infringers where considering whether
injunctive relief should be granted.39
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Intervisual Commc’ns, Inc. v. Volkert, 975 F. Supp. 1092, 1104 (N.D. Ill. 1997)
(citing Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506–07 (1959)).
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008).
92 CONG. REC. 6, 7524 (1946) (statement of Rep. Lanham).
Id.
See Barrus v. Sylvania, 55 F.3d 468, 469 (9th Cir. 1995); Serbin v. Ziebart Int’l
Corp., 11 F.3d 1163, 1179 (3d Cir. 1993).
See infra pp. 379–85.
See infra pp. 389–92.
See infra pp. 392–95.
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II. BACKGROUND
Until 2006, it was generally assumed by litigants and courts that if
a movant seeking a preliminary injunction for infringement of its
intellectual property could establish that it had a meritorious claim—
meaning, infringement likely had occurred and was ongoing—the
harm to the movant would be considered irreparable.40 On that basis,
an injunction would be issued if the other two factors—public interest
and balance of the hardships—were decided in the movant’s favor.41
In essence, upon a showing of likelihood of success on the merits,
courts were inclined to presume from the movant’s showing that
trademark infringement occurred, or was likely to occur, that
irreparable harm to the mark’s owner would result.42 This result
followed, in the opinion of some courts, because the senior trademark
user (the movant) had lost the ability to restrict use and control of its
property right.43 Preliminary injunctions, then, followed a showing
of likelihood of success on the merits without the movant’s need to
offer any evidence that it had actually suffered irreparable harm.44
In 2006, the Supreme Court of the United States directly changed
the assumption that irreparable harm would be presumed in a patent
infringement action and indirectly in a copyright action.45 The Court
in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC was confronted with the issue of
whether irreparable harm resulting from a finding of patent
infringement following trial on the merits should be presumed in the
absence of evidence of actual irreparable harm, or whether it must be
established by the patentee before a permanent injunction would
issue after the patentee had succeeded on the merits of its patent
infringement claim.46
eBay was appealed from the District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia to the Federal Circuit Court, and then to the Supreme
Court.47 The Supreme Court reversed the holding of the Federal
Circuit Court, which in essence had ruled that upon a showing of

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring).
Id. at 391–92 (majority opinion).
See id. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
See, e.g., U.S. Polo Ass’n, Inc. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 800 F. Supp. 2d 515,
540 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, 511 F. App’x 81 (2d Cir. 2013); 5 MCCARTHY, supra
note 31, § 30:47.
See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 544–46 (1987).
eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 392–93.
Id. at 391.
Id. at 393–94.
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infringement, a patentee was generally entitled to injunctive relief.48
In reversing the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court held that general
equitable principles govern the grant of a permanent injunction, and
that principles controlling whether a court should grant equitable
relief are embodied in a four-factor test which includes (1) the
existence of irreparable injury; (2) inadequacy of remedies at law; (3)
balancing the hardships; and (4) whether the public interest would be
served by injunctive relief.49 The Court’s holding, that irreparable
harm is not to be presumed but must be established, has been applied
by some courts in copyright50 and trademark cases.51 Indeed, the
Court wrote that this standard was applicable to copyright actions,52
but failed to discuss trademark actions.
That the patentee won its trial and established both infringement
and validity of its patent was not sufficient grounds for the district
court to grant injunctive relief preventing the infringer from using,
manufacturing or selling the patented software.53 The district court
judge, Judge Friedman, first recognized “when, as here, ‘validity and
continuing infringement have been clearly established . . . immediate
irreparable harm is presumed.’”54 But this, he next observed, was a
rebuttable presumption.55 Judge Friedman concluded that the
presumption of irreparable harm that might have otherwise existed
with a finding of infringement was rebutted because the patentee, a
non-practicing entity, had not excluded others from practicing the
invention but had, instead, licensed third parties, and had even
offered its invention to the Defendant who had refused a license but
took the technology nevertheless.56 The Defendant opposed the
motion for injunctive relief arguing that money damages were an
adequate remedy.57 The court’s denial of the requested injunction
was appealed to the Federal Circuit, which reversed the district
court’s failure to grant injunctive relief and remanded.58 The Federal
Circuit reiterated that it is the “general rule that courts will issue
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 394.
Id. at 391–92.
Bethesda Softworks, LLC v. Interplay Entm’t Corp., 452 F. App’x 351, 354 (4th Cir.
2011); Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 77–78 (2d Cir. 2010).
Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Entm’t Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1249 (9th Cir.
2013).
eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 392.
MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 710–15 (E.D. Va. 2003).
Id. at 711 (alteration in original) (quoting Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 14 F.
Supp. 2d 785, 794 (E.D. Va. 1998)).
Id. at 712.
Id.
Id. at 713.
MercExchange, LLC, v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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permanent injunctions against patent infringement absent exceptional
circumstances,” which, in essence, established a presumption in
patent infringement matters that would need to be followed by district
courts hearing patent claims, and, of course, the Federal Circuit.59
On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Federal
Circuit’s decision, holding that irreparable harm should not be
presumed in patent infringement cases seeking injunctive relief and
that a plaintiff must establish it has suffered irreparable harm and that
harm will continue in the absence of an injunction.60
Two years following its decision in eBay, the Supreme Court in
Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, reiterated its holding
in eBay.61 This time the Court dealt with a preliminary, not a
permanent, injunction.62 The Court held that a party seeking
preliminary injunctive relief must demonstrate that irreparable harm
is likely in the absence of an injunction.63 The Court directed lower
courts to “pay particular regard for the public consequences in
employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.”64 But, ironically,
the Court did not consider the regard for public consequences
resulting from the failure to grant injunctive relief.65
In eBay, the Supreme Court dealt specifically with patent
infringement, but also held that the requirement to obtain injunctive
relief “is consistent with our treatment of injunctions under the
Copyright Act.”66 In so holding, the Court signaled that a party
seeking injunctive relief in a patent and a copyright infringement
action must establish irreparable harm, and that it is not permissible
for a court to presume irreparable harm exists.67 Thus, once the
Supreme Court had specifically dealt with copyright and patent
actions, it became logical for courts to question whether the holdings
of the Supreme Court in eBay and Winter also applied to trademark
actions. Surely there was no limiting language contained in either
decision that would prevent Winter and eBay from applying to

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 1339.
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006).
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008).
Id. at 12.
Id. at 24.
Id. (quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982)).
See generally id. at 24–34 (explaining the variables the court considers in granting
injunctive relief for a preliminary injunction).
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006).
Id. at 391, 394.
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trademark infringement actions.68 Nor was there any specific
reference in those cases to trademark causes of action.69
The question remains unanswered by the Supreme Court whether a
movant who has established likelihood of confusion in a trademark
action is entitled to a presumption of irreparable harm or, whether the
movant must establish to the court’s satisfaction that it has suffered,
and will continue to suffer, irreparable harm. It is not surprising that
various courts have come to differing conclusions concerning
irreparable harm in trademark actions in the absence of direct
instructions from the Supreme Court.70
III. DISCUSSION
Since Winter and eBay were decided, there have been sporadic
lower court decisions addressing whether, in a trademark
infringement case, a party moving for preliminary or permanent
injunctive relief is required to establish (along with the other three
necessary factors) that irreparable harm will occur if the injunction is
not issued.71 The question is hardly resolved.
A number of Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals, including the
Second, Third, Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, have addressed
whether irreparable harm in an intellectual property infringement
action must be established in order for an injunction to be issued, but
not all of these courts have addressed this question in the context of
trademark infringement.72
For instance, the Second Circuit’s
decision in Salinger and the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Bethesda
Softworks LLC v. Interplay Entertainment Corp., require the movant
to establish irreparable harm in copyright cases, rather than presume
irreparable harm upon a finding of likelihood of success, or actual
success, on the merits.73

68.

69.
70.
71.
72.

73.

See generally Winter, 555 U.S. at 23–24 (discussing the requirements for the
preliminary injunction of the Navy’s sonar training); eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 390–94
(recognizing that injunctive relief for copyright and patent infringement is granted at
the discretion of the court).
See generally Winter, 555 U.S. at 23–24; eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 390–94.
See Ronald T. Coleman, Jr., Trishanda L. Treadwell & Elizabeth A. Loyd,
Applicability of the Presumption of Irreparable Harm After eBay, 32 FRANCHISE L.J.
3, 5–7 (2002).
See id.
Ferring Pharms., Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2014);
Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Florida Entm’t Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1248–49 (9th
Cir. 2013); Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 78 (2d Cir. 2010); N. Am. Med. Corp.
v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1228 (11th Cir. 2008).
Bethesda Softworks, LLC v. Interplay Entm’t Corp., 452 F. App’x 351, 354–55 (4th
Cir. 2011); Salinger, 607 F.3d at 78.
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In some circuits, such as the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
district courts within the circuit are extrapolating their circuit court’s
decision in another subject area, such as Salinger to copyrights, to
actions brought to enjoin trademark infringement.74 There are no
decisions from the Second Circuit holding that irreparable harm
cannot be presumed in a trademark infringement case. However, that
court in Salinger applied the Supreme Court’s eBay decision relating
to eradication of the presumption of irreparable harm to copyright
infringement actions.75 On the basis of Salinger, at least one district
court in the Second Circuit has applied the holding in Salinger to
actions brought to enjoin trademark infringement.76 Whereas the
District Court for the District of Connecticut in ComPsych Corp. v.
Health Champion LLC did not directly decide whether Salinger’s
decision against the presumption of irreparable harm extends to
trademark cases, the court cited to the Salinger decision wherein the
court stated that it found “no reason that eBay would not apply with
equal force to an injunction in any type of case.”77 Furthermore, the
court acknowledged that following the Salinger decision, “most
courts have applied eBay’s standard to trademark actions.”78 Once
again, there was no analysis of the differences, if any, in the harm
suffered from trademark versus copyright infringement, or by whom
the harm will be suffered.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, upon a finding of likelihood
of success on the merits, appears to favor a presumption of
irreparable harm in trademark infringement actions. While it does
not directly say so, in its decision in Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC
v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., the court went so far as to
hold, “irreparable harm is especially likely in a trademark case
because of the difficulty of quantifying the likely effect on a brand of
a nontrivial period of consumer confusion (and the interval between
the filing of a trademark infringement complaint and final judgment
is sure not to be trivial).”79 It would appear from this decision that, in
its decision to grant injunctive relief, the court connects a “strong
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. AGA Sols., Inc. 589 F. Supp. 2d 195, 204 (E.D.N.Y.
2008).
Salinger, 607 F.3d at 77.
U.S. Polo Ass’n, Inc. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 800 F. Supp. 2d 515, 539–40
(S.D.N.Y. 2014).
ComPsych Corp. v. Health Champion LLC, No. 3:12CV692 (VLB), 2012 WL
6212653, at *4 (D. Conn. Dec. 13, 2012).
Id.
Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 735 F.3d
735, 741 (7th Cir. 2013).
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likelihood of prevailing in the full trial” and the damage done to the
mark’s owner if the injunction is denied.80 Arguably under Winter,
the first element, the likelihood of prevailing on the trademark
infringement claim must be established by the movant, but once
established it would appear improper to resort to a sliding scale by
which the need to issue the injunction increases with the strength of
the likelihood of prevailing on the merits.81
The First Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with the issue of
whether irreparable harm should be presumed in a trademark case in
Voice of the Arab World, Inc. v. MDTV Medical News Now, Inc.82
Appellant appealed the grant of a preliminary injunction following
the district court’s determination that in a trademark case irreparable
harm is presumed once the movant establishes it is likely to succeed
in establishing infringement.83 The appellant contended that the
district court’s presumption was inconsistent with the eBay opinion.84
The First Circuit Court of Appeals did not decide whether such a
presumption was categorically correct and instead reversed the
district court on the grounds that the district court abused its
discretion by applying the presumption in a situation where appellee
waited almost ten years before moving to enjoin the infringement.85
The court wrote:
[I]t is unnecessary to decide at this time whether the rule
relied upon by the district court (i.e., irreparable harm is
presumed upon a finding of likelihood of success on the
merits of a trademark infringement claim) is consistent with
such principles, because—even if we assume without
deciding that such rule is good law—we still find that the
district court abused its discretion . . . .86
Both the Ninth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have
examined whether a presumption of irreparable harm exists in a
trademark infringement matter, or whether the party seeking
injunctive relief must establish it will suffer irreparable harm in the

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 740.
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 51 (2008).
Voice of the Arab World, Inc. v. MDTV Med. News Now, Inc., 645 F.3d 26, 31 (1st
Cir. 2011).
Id. at 28.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 34–35.
Id. at 31.
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absence of an injunction.87 In Herb Reed Enterprises, LLC v. Florida
Entertainment Management, Inc., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
recited, “[a]s the district court acknowledged, two recent Supreme
Court cases have cast doubt on the validity of this court’s previous
rule that the likelihood of ‘irreparable injury may be
presumed . . . .’”88 Relying on the Supreme Court’s dicta that
“[n]othing in the Patent Act indicates that Congress intended such a
departure” from the need to establish irreparable harm, the court
appropriated the reasoning from the Supreme Court’s conclusion that
patent and copyright claims were of a similar nature and held that “so
too nothing in the Lanham Act indicates that Congress intended a
departure for trademark infringement cases.”89 Perhaps if the court
had considered the distinction of patent and copyright causes of
action as compared to trademark actions, and the difference in harm
resulting to consumers, it would not have so ruled, or at least, not
without better explanation.
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit, using strong language, held that a
party seeking permanent or preliminary injunctive relief in a
trademark case must establish irreparable harm; it will not be
presumed regardless of whether the party can establish it is likely to
succeed on the merits.90
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in a decision dealing with
the Lanham Act, abolished the presumption of irreparable harm, after
extending such a presumption for many years.91 The basis for the
abolition of the presumption of irreparable harm was the court’s
belief that it needed to adhere to the “traditional principles of equity”
cited by the Supreme Court in eBay.92 The Eleventh Circuit also
considered the similarity of the language affording injunctive relief in

87.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Compare Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Entm’t Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1251
(9th Cir. 2013) (finding that plaintiffs in a trademark infringement case “seeking
injunctive relief must proffer evidence sufficient to establish a likelihood of
irreparable harm”), with N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d
1211, 1227–28 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding that “prior cases do extend a presumption of
irreparable harm once a plaintiff establishes a likelihood of success on the merits of a
trademark infringement claim”).
Herb Reed Enters., LLC, 736 F.3d at 1248–49 (quoting Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc.
v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1066 (9th Cir. 1999)).
Id. at 1249 (quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391–92
(2006)).
Id. at 1251.
See N. Am. Med. Corp., 522 F.3d at 1227–29; Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Cmty. Coll.
Dist., 889 F.2d 1018, 1026, 1029 (11th Cir. 1989).
N. Am. Med. Corp., 522 F.3d at 1228 (quoting eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 393).
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both the Lanham and Patent Acts as a basis for its decision.93 There
was an analysis of the different damages caused by patent and
trademark infringement, but not the persons to whom those damages
might apply and why.94
It is quite clear that to some courts, there is little difference
between patent and copyright actions, and the harm caused thereby,
whether to the interests of a commercial party, or to consumers who
rely on trademarks to analyze and select goods and services.95
Recently, Judge David N. Hurd, United States District Judge for
the Northern District of New York, succinctly summarized what he
viewed as the state of the law regarding presumption of irreparable
harm in the Second Circuit.96 The cause of action he addressed was
not trademark infringement, but was instead false advertising, also a
violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.97 After reciting the
necessary elements that must be established for a successful cause of
action, Judge Hurd began his analysis of the preliminary injunction
standard by quoting Magistrate Judge Mann’s decision in Golden
Krust Patties, Inc. v. Bullock: “[t]o say that there is confusion in this
Circuit regarding the appropriate standard for assessing an
application for a preliminary injunction would be an
understatement.”98 Nevertheless, the court did not conclude either
way regarding whether a presumption of irreparable harm exists, or
whether a movant must prove that irreparable harm will follow denial
of an injunction.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals decided another case in which
false advertising in violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act was
alleged.99 The court held it had never recognized a presumption of
irreparable harm in a false advertising case.100 The Third Circuit,
however, had applied a presumption of irreparable harm in trademark
cases under the Act prior to eBay and Winter.101 It noted that, in
addition to lost revenue, the victim of false advertising was
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
Id.
See eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 391–93. It is very unlikely that a consumer buying a
garden hose cares who owns the patent to that hose, but it is much more likely to rely
on the trademark under which it is sold to judge quality, value, and reliability.
Chobani, LLC v. Dannon Co., 157 F. Supp. 3d 190, 203–05 (N.D.N.Y. 2016).
Id. at 194, 199.
Id. at 198 (quoting Golden Krust Patties, Inc. v. Bullock, 957 F. Supp. 2d 186, 194
(E.D.N.Y. 2013)).
Ferring Pharm., Inc. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 206–07 (3d Cir. 2014).
Id. at 210.
Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 726 (3d Cir. 2004); Opticians Ass’n
of Am. v. Indep. Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 1990).

2017

Who Will Protect the Consumers?

387

potentially at risk for damage to the “product or brand’s
reputation.”102 That, the court wrote, would cause irreparable harm
that was difficult to quantify.103 Nevertheless, the injury that the
court recognized was injury to the seller of the goods that were the
subject of the false claims—not, it would appear, the consumers
injured because they bought the goods in reliance on the false claims.
Noting that “[t]he Lanham Act’s injunctive relief provision is
premised upon traditional principles of equity, like the Patent
Act’s,”104 the Third Circuit adopted the rational, applying it at least to
false advertising claims brought under the Act, and held that “a
presumption of irreparable harm deviates from the traditional
principles of equity, which require a movant to demonstrate
irreparable harm.”105 Thus, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
eliminated the presumption of irreparable harm “afforded to parties
seeking injunctive relief in Lanham Act cases,” at least as to false
advertising claims.106 It did not distinguish between false advertising
cases and trademark infringement cases, and based on its decision in
Ferring, there is little or no reason to expect that the court would rule
differently if the matter before it were a trademark infringement
action and the allegation was that the defendant’s infringement
caused consumer confusion.
Arguably, as does trademark
infringement, false advertising affects the buying decisions of
consumers and harms more than just the competitor; it results in
deception of the consumers who rely on the false claim. However,
the court discussed only the harm to the competitor.107 It failed in
any way to mention the effect of false advertising on consumers and
the harm that results.
Since the decisions of eBay and Winter, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals has not addressed the question of whether irreparable harm
should be presumed in trademark cases. The last time the Fourth
Circuit ruled concerning the presumption of irreparable harm in a
case arising under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act was in 2002.108
In Scotts, confronted with a false advertising claim, the court wrote,
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

108.

Ferring Pharm., Inc., 765 F.3d at 212.
Id.
Id. at 214.
Id. at 216.
Id.
See generally id. The Third Circuit took a lengthy sojourn exploring how false
advertising dilutes competitive advantages, only mentioning consumers in the aspect
of their money, not the harm that can be caused to them based on the false
advertising. Id.
Scotts Co. v. United Indus. Corp., 315 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2002).
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“[i]n Lanham Act cases involving trademark infringement, a
presumption of irreparable injury is generally applied once the
plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of confusion, the key element
in an infringement case.”109 Since Scotts, there have been a number
of district court decisions in the Fourth Circuit, even since eBay and
Winter, that have held in favor of such a presumption of irreparable
harm.110
For example, in Rebel Debutante LLC v. Forsythe Cosmetic Group,
Ltd., Judge Schroeder recognized that injunctive relief is “an
extraordinary remedy . . . which is to be applied only in [the] limited
circumstances which clearly demand it.”111
Although Judge
Schroeder recognized that “a plaintiff must establish . . . that he is
likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,”
he acknowledged that “in the context of a Lanham Act trademark
infringement case . . . ‘a presumption of irreparable injury is
generally applied once the plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of
confusion, the key element in an infringement case.’”112 Judge
Schroeder referred to eBay in his opinion but distinguished it from
the matter at hand on several grounds.113 First, eBay involved a
permanent injunction and Rebel Debutante dealt with a preliminary
injunction, an order requested to preserve the status quo until trial.114
Second, he distinguished copyright and patent cases from trademark
cases, in which he wrote (referring to trademark actions), “where
confusion may have long-lasting effects.”115 And finally, he relied on
the fact that other district courts in the Fourth Circuit applied the
presumption in trademark actions.116 Judge Schroeder did not

109.
110.

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 273 (citing Eli Lilly & Co. v. Nat. Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 469 (7th Cir.
2000); Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir.
1997)).
PGI Polymer, Inc. v. Church & Dwight Co., No. 3:15-CV-00214-FDW-DSC, 2015
WL 5920013, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 9, 2015); Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc. v. Zeal, LLC,
135 F. Supp. 3d 451, 456–57 (D.S.C. 2015); De Simone v. VSL Pharm., Inc., 133 F.
Supp. 3d 776, 780 (D. Md. 2015); Diamonds Direct USA, Inc. v. BFJ Holdings, Inc.,
895 F. Supp. 2d 752, 755 (E.D. Va. 2012); Rebel Debutante LLC v. Forsythe
Cosmetic Grp., Ltd., 799 F. Supp. 2d 558, 580 (M.D.N.C. 2011).
Rebel Debutante LLC, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 568 (quoting Direx Israel, Ltd. v.
Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 811 (4th Cir. 1991)).
Id. at 568, 579 (first quoting W. Va. Ass’n of Club Owners & Fraternal Services,
Inc. v. Musgrave, 553 F.3d 292, 298 (4th Cir. 2009); and then quoting Scotts Co. v.
United Industries Corp., 315 F.3d 264, 273 (4th Cir. 2002)).
Id. at 579.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Meineke Car Care Ctrs., Inc. v. Catton, No. 3:10-CV-000234-RLV-DSC,
2010 WL 2572875, at *2 (W.D.N.C. June 24, 2010); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. S &
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identify, however, the victim of the long-lasting effects of confusion,
whether it be the mark’s owner, the consumers of the goods identified
by the mark, or both.
District courts within the Fourth Circuit are not completely settled
regarding the presumption of irreparable harm and at least one has
broken ranks with other district courts that favor the existence of a
presumption of irreparable harm once likelihood of confusion on the
merits is established. Judge Davis of the Eastern District of Virginia,
in Pro-Concepts v. Resh, questioned whether the presumption of
irreparable harm in a trademark infringement action still exists
following the Supreme Court’s Winter decision.117 Judge Davis
wrote, “As a threshold matter, it is unlikely that the presumption
alleged in the context of trademark infringement remains viable after
the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter.”118 Elaborating further
Judge Davis stated that because a plaintiff bears the burden to
establish irreparable harm, “the Court should not rely on a
presumption of irreparable injury based on the likelihood that [the
Defendant’s] actions—whether intentional or not—are likely to
confuse or mislead . . . .”119 In Pro-Concepts, however, it would
appear that the court concluded that the evidence presented did not
establish irreparable injury. Nevertheless, it appears that Judge Davis
did not recognize the presumption of irreparable harm in trademark
infringement cases and his basis for not doing so was Winter.
Most of the decisions of the district courts in the Fourth Circuit that
continue to adopt the presumption that irreparable harm follows a
finding of likelihood of success on the merits, do so with little or no
reason expressed, other than to hold that the Supreme Court in eBay
did not apply the presumption to preliminary injunctions120 or to

117.
118.
119.
120.

M Brands, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 2d 581, 587 (E.D. Va. 2009); Toolchex, Inc. v. Trainor,
634 F. Supp. 2d 586, 591 n.2 (E.D. Va. 2008)).
Pro-Concepts, LLC v. Resh, No. 2:12CV573, 2013 WL 5741542, at *21 (E.D. Va.
Oct. 22, 2013).
Id. Judge Davis held that in this trademark action, the court would not rely on a
presumption of irreparable injury resulting from confusion of customers. Id.
Id.
In relying on the holding in eBay that the Supreme Court did not apply the
presumption to a preliminary injunction, the 2011 decision Rebel Debutante LLC v.
Forsythe Cosmetic Group, Ltd. appears to overlook the Supreme Court’s 2008
Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. decision, which did involve a
preliminary injunction and abolished the presumption of irreparable harm. See Rebel
Debutante LLC, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 579; Winter, 555 U.S. at 22.
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trademark actions.121 Judge Deborah Chasanow, sitting in the
Southern Division of the District of Maryland, adopted the
presumption of irreparable harm in a case in which the author
represented the plaintiff in a trademark infringement action.122 Judge
Chasanow held that, “Plaintiff is likely to suffer irreparable harm
from Defendant’s continued unauthorized use of its marks.”123 She
ruled that courts generally will presume that irreparable harm has
occurred where the trademark owner establishes it is likely to succeed
on the merits of its infringement claim.124 Judge Chasanow,
however, delved a bit deeper and explained the cause of irreparable
harm, citing Judge Learned Hand’s pronouncement, as applied by the
Fourth Circuit’s decision in Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, “if
another uses [someone’s trademark], he borrows the owner’s
reputation whose quality no longer lies within his own control. This
is an injury, even though the borrower does not tarnish it, or divert
any sales by its use.”125
There is a distinction to be drawn between the damages caused
from trademark infringement as contrasted with the damages caused
by patent and copyright infringement. In the typical patent or
copyright infringement case, the plaintiff has lost the ability to
exclusively control the use of the invention or expression, or to say it
another way, the owner of these property rights is granted, by statute,
a right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale or
selling the patented invention,126 or from reproducing, distributing,
or, among other rights, creating derivative works from the
copyrighted expression.127 The common thread that is sewn by
Congress joining rights granted to patentees and holders of
copyrights is the right to exclude others from use.128 The mere fact
that an infringer has violated any of the exclusive rights of the patent
or copyright holder may result in the loss of monetary benefit to the
owner of the right. And often the owner of the right earns its income
from the right by licensing others to practice or otherwise exploit the
right. Consumers are not directly affected by the infringement.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Rebel Debutante LLC, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 579–80 (quoting National League of
Junior Cotillions, Inc. v. Porter, No. 3:06-CV-508-RJC, 2007 WL 2316823, at *6
(W.D.N.C. Aug. 9, 2007), aff’d, 280 F. App’x 322 (4th Cir. 2008)).
Potomac Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Takoma Acad. Alumni
Ass’n, Inc., No. DKC 13-1128, 2014 WL 857947, at *19 (D. Md. Mar. 4, 2014).
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1535 (4th Cir. 1984)).
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012).
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
See id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1).
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As the Supreme Court has clearly established, a party seeking an
injunction, whether preliminary or permanent, must establish that it
will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of the grant of the
injunction.129 Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion in eBay
noted that the world of patent rights has changed and that “[a]n
industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for
producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining
licensing fees.”130 It is logical to require a party seeking an
injunction in a patent or copyright case where damages may be either
irreparable or merely monetary to establish to the court that in the
absence of injunctive relief the party will indeed suffer irreparable
harm that cannot be compensated for by monetary damages.
IV. THE NEED FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION
When the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Herb Reed
Enterprises, LLC v. Florida Entertainment Management, Inc., held
that “nothing in the Lanham Act indicates that Congress intended a
departure for trademark infringement cases,”131 perhaps it could have
dug a bit deeper into what Congress intended when the Act was
debated and later enacted, and whom Congress intended to protect by
its enactment. Trademarks are different than patents and copyrights
as trademarks serve a different purpose than patents and copyrights.
In general terms, trademarks serve to designate a source of goods and
services.132 Surely, to their owners they are valuable intangible assets
and must be protected from infringers. But, within this value, to their
owners lies their core value. Trademarks allow consumers to choose
among goods based on the quality of the goods and the reputation of
the source.133 For this reason alone, courts should not treat
trademarks as they do patents and copyrights when a movant seeks
injunctive relief. Professor McCarthy has observed that the basic
policy behind the law of unfair competition is “[t]he interest of the
public in not being deceived.”134 The second purpose, more akin to
patent and copyright policy, is to protect a plaintiff’s property rights
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Florida Entm’t Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1249 (9th
Cir. 2013).
1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §
3:1 (4th ed. 2016).
Id. § 3:10.
Id. § 2:1 (citing Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imps., Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 694
(S.D.N.Y. 1963)).
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built up through use of its marks.135 Thus, McCarthy opines there are
two goals of modern trademark law: to protect consumers from
confusion and deception, and to protect the plaintiff’s property.136
Professor McCarthy’s opinion is supported by the 1992 decision of
the Supreme Court recognizing that trademarks, or trade dress, allow
consumers to select the goods or services of another.137 This policy,
or goal, was reported by the United States Senate in a 1946 report
relating to the Act. The report read, in part:
The purpose underlying any trade-mark statute is twofold.
One is to protect the public so it may be confident that, in
purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark which
it favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for
and wants to get.138
In addition to the protection of the public, another goal of
trademark law expressed in the report is the protection of the mark’s
owner’s interest in time and money in building the value and
recognition of the mark.139 When the provisions of Section 32 of the
Act were debated in 1944, Representative Lanham testified on behalf
of its inclusion with a view of protecting the public.140 As did
Congressman Lanham almost seventy years ago, the Supreme Court
has recognized that a purpose of the Act is the protection of

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id.
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 763 (1992).
S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 1274 (1946).
Id.
An Act to Provide for the Registration and Protection of Trade-marks Used in
Commerce, to Carry Out the Provisions of Certain International Conventions, and
for Other Purposes: Hearing on H.R. 82 Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on
Patents, 78th Cong. 73 (1944) (“Since we are trying to protect the public, I think we
are going pretty far afield with reference to some possibilities that might arise.”)
(statement of Rep. Fritz G. Lanham). Additionally, Representative Lanham testified:
I think that the protection of the public is of paramount
importance with reference to goods that the public consumes and
that some second party ought not be allowed to come along, take
liberties with the trade-mark, and represent that it is just about the
same thing or the same product exactly.
Id. The Department of Justice presented its opinion on the topics at these hearings.
Responding to Representative Lanham’s above comments, Justice Department
representative Moyer testified, “I may say that I agree completely with Congressman
Lanham’s statement as to the necessity of protecting the public. I believe we are one
in wishing for public protection and prevention of the palming off of one person’s
goods as the goods of another person.” Id. at 74 (statement by Spec. Assistant to
Att’y Gen. Elliot H. Moyer).
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consumers from being misled by the use of infringing marks.141 The
Fourth Circuit, likewise, has held “Congress intended the Lanham
Act to protect consumers from confusion in the marketplace . . . .”142
The protection of consumers from confusion and deception is not
the only benefit provided to consumers by trademarks. For example,
trademarks allow consumers to distinguish high quality products
from those of lower quality.143
Still another consumer benefit provided by trademarks is that
trademarks reduce the cost of learning about a product.144 Without
brand names or other means of identifying makers of goods, or
providers of services, consumers face larger risks and incur greater
costs of developing information about goods and services.145 Judge
Posner echoed the belief that trademarks are of great value to
consumers:
The fundamental purpose of a trademark is to reduce
consumer search costs by providing a concise and
unequivocal identifier of the particular source of particular
goods. The consumer who knows at a glance whose brand
he is being asked to buy knows whom to hold responsible if
the brand disappoints and whose product to buy in the future
if the brand pleases.146
Judge Posner expressed what he believed to be the fundamental
benefit a trademark imparts to a consumer: ease and reduced cost of
selection of goods and services.147 He also touched on the issue of
reputation of the mark’s owner.148 But, clearly, Judge Posner
recognized that a trademark affixed to goods provides a valuable
benefit directly to consumers, and the results of that benefit
encourage a trademark owner to maintain the quality of the goods
and services that bear the mark—yet another benefit to consumers
who have come to rely on a mark in their selection of goods and
services.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 428 (2003).
Radiance Found., Inc. v. NAACP, 786 F.3d 316, 323 (4th Cir. 2015).
RICHARD CRASWELL, FTC OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING, TRADEMARKS, CONSUMER
INFORMATION AND BARRIERS TO COMPETITION 15 (1979).
See ARMEN ALCHIAN & WILLIAM R. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION:
COMPETITION, COORDINATION, AND CONTROL 110–11 (John Mahaney & Larry Olsen
eds., 2d ed. 1977).
See id.
Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002).
Id.
Id.
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Consumers of trademarked goods do not have standing to sue
trademark infringers under the Act. The Supreme Court has held that
“[i]dentifying the interests protected by the Lanham Act, however,
requires no guesswork, since the Act includes an ‘unusual, and
extraordinarily helpful,’ detailed statement of the statute’s
purposes.”149 And while the language of the Court would state that
the Act’s goal is the protection of persons engaged in commerce
within Congress’ control, the other decisions of the Court,150 and the
legislative history of the Act,151 make clear that a purpose of the Act
is the protection of consumers. Courts have excluded those who are
not engaged in commerce and within a so-called “zone-of-interests”
from standing to bring a suit for trademark infringement or false
advertising.152 That clearly excludes a consumer who has been
deceived by an infringer’s use of another’s mark. And while this
makes sense to avoid clogging the federal courts with consumer suits
over infringement, the non-commercial interests of those consumers
are worthy of protection, and are a stated goal of the Act. Who, then,
protects consumers of trademarked goods under the Act if consumers
are unable to protect themselves?
In order to establish a claim for trademark infringement under the
Act, the plaintiff must establish that the use of the mark by the
defendant is likely to result in confusion as to source of the goods,
sponsorship or affiliation.153 Each circuit has adopted its own set of
factors it applies to determine whether there is a likelihood of
149.

150.
151.
152.
153.

Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1389 (2014)
(quoting H.B. Halicki Prods v. United Artists Commc’ns, Inc., 812 F.2d 1213, 1214
(9th Cir. 1987). Section 45 of the Act provides:
The intent of this chapter is to regulate commerce within
the control of Congress by making actionable the deceptive and
misleading use of marks in such commerce; to protect registered
marks used in such commerce from interference by State, or
territorial legislation; to protect persons engaged in such
commerce against unfair competition; to prevent fraud and
deception in such commerce by the use of reproductions, copies,
counterfeits, or colorable imitations of registered marks; and to
provide rights and remedies stipulated by treaties and conventions
respecting trademarks, trade names, and unfair competition
entered into between the United States and foreign nations.
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).
Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985).
Hearing on H.R. 82 Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on Patents, supra note 140,
at 73–74 (statements of Rep. Fritz G. Lanham & Spec. Assistant to Att'y Gen. Elliot
H. Moyer).
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1388
(2014).
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2012).
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confusion arising from the use by defendant of a mark, but all sets of
factors are similar.154 When the question of whether the use of the
defendant’s mark is likely to result in consumer confusion is
answered in the affirmative, infringement has been established.155
Once that occurs, injury to two interests have occurred. First, there is
damage to a plaintiff’s property interest in its mark. Assuming for
argument’s sake that the defendant is making its product exactly as
the plaintiff does, that its warranty and customer service is exactly the
same as plaintiff’s, and that there is absolutely no difference in the
quality, safety, and longevity of the two products, then arguably
plaintiff’s reputation has not suffered, and plaintiff has only lost
profits from the sales made by defendant while employing plaintiff’s
mark. It is, however, highly unlikely that each of the above elements
will be the same, but if they are, a defendant in those circumstances
will claim that money, alone, will compensate a plaintiff for its lost
sales. The defendant must be capable of paying the compensation.
This analysis may be a bit shallow because enhanced production by
plaintiff can lead to lower costs and increased market penetration, but
even so, these losses may be capable of quantification and the cost to
the plaintiff may be added to damages. A court has discretion,
subject to the principles of equity in awarding monetary damages in a
trademark case.156 It can increase its award of damages up to three
times the amount of actual damages; it can adjust its award of profits
up or down as it “find[s] to be just.”157
V. CONCLUSION
The language of the Act fails to address harm to the consumer
caused by the defendant’s acts of trademark infringement, as those
harms are earlier described. But Congress, nevertheless, intended the
Act to protect consumers of trademarked goods and the testimony of
Congressman Lanham reflected this, as did opinions of the Supreme
Court.158 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, in both eBay and Winter,
neither being a trademark decision, did not have to address the harms
caused to consumers by defendant’s acts of trademark

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

E.g., George & Co. LLC v. Imagination Entm’t Ltd., 575 F.3d 383, 393 (4th Cir.
2009) (applying nine factors enumerated in the case).
Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 152 (4th Cir. 2012).
15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012).
Id.
S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 1274–77 (1946).
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infringement.159 These potential harms to consumers can include
confusion, deception, and deprivation of an economic manner to
accurately distinguish the goods of one seller from another. These
are critical benefits, and if taken from a consumer, they will harm the
consumer.
In a trademark infringement case, it is submitted, irreparable harm
befalls those consumers of trademarked goods whose marks are the
subject of infringement. Once infringement is shown likely, it should
not be necessary to establish that irreparable harm to the mark’s
owner will follow. The courts should consider the irreparable harm
caused to consumers who are confused by the infringement or who
make unintended selections of goods or services based on
defendant’s use of an infringing mark. This harm to the consumer,
who is unable to represent himself in a Lanham Act claim, should be
presumed and should form the basis for injunctive relief that will
prevent a defendant from further use of a mark that will result in
confusion. A court should consider that these confused consumers do
not have standing under the Act, and there is no one readily available
to protect their interests. Consumers should be free from confusion
and deception and should be able to use marks to select services and
products they desire to consume. Requiring a mark’s owner to
establish that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm as a condition to
the issuance of injunction ignores the harm that will befall a class of
consumers once the plaintiff establishes it is likely to succeed on the
merits of its infringement claim or has already prevailed on the merits
at trial, or by summary judgment. Once the plaintiff establishes the
likelihood of success, or actual success, on the merits, courts should
recognize the interests of the consuming public and enjoin the
infringing conduct, if not to protect the mark’s owner, to protect
consumers.

159.

The Court in eBay considered the act of copyright infringement. The Court
indicated its patent holding was consistent with its copyright holdings and that patent
and copyright property rights were similar. See supra pp. 379–81.

